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ABSTRACT
A limitation of standard Description Logics is its inability to reason with uncertain and vague knowledge. Although
probabilistic and fuzzy extensions of DLs exist, which provide an explicit representation of uncertainty, they do not provide
an explicit means for reasoning about second order uncertainty. Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence (DST) overcomes this
weakness and provides means to fuse and reason about uncertain information. In this paper, we combine DL-Lite with
DST to allow scalable reasoning over uncertain semantic knowledge bases. Furthermore, our formalism allows for the
detection of conflicts between the fused information and domain constraints. Finally, we propose methods to resolve such
conflicts through trust revision by exploiting evidence regarding the information sources. The effectiveness of the proposed
approaches is shown through simulations under various settings.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Effective and efficient decision making plays a crucial role in success of any operation. Key to successful decision making
is the effective interpretation of the available data about the given domain – i.e., Data-to-Decisions (D2D). This is especially
true for coalition operations where the operations are critical and data-centric. It is important to note that the data gathered
by sources may represent supporting or negating evidence about a particular phenomenon in the domain. For example,
an acoustic array may have recorded a series of engine signatures and have deduced that it is of a military truck – i.e., its
interpretation of the gathered evidence. Thus, the engine signatures can be taken as the evidence that support a proposition
such as military vehicle is in motion. This can be taken as the opinion of the sensor about a particular phenomena based on
its current observations. Assume that a seismic sensor has also picked-up a set of vibration signatures and deduced that it
is of a heavy vehicle moving from north – i.e., its opinion about the environment based on its current observations. These
opinions may support a global proposition such as military vehicle moving from north.
However, in data heavy environments such as coalition operations utilizing data to make informed decisions is not
straightforward. This is because data that has to be consumed in order to make decisions are from multiple parties with
different granularities and confidence levels. For example, a coalition partner may obfuscate data in order to hide a specific
information or may reduce the resolution of data if it has less trust on the sharing party. Therefore, these data will have
an inherent uncertainty that has to be considered while fusing to make decisions. There are many approaches studied
in literature to address this issue and evidential theory1 is probably the best known. However, it has been shown that
the approaches based on the evidential theory suffer from evidence compatibility issues when presented with conflicting
opinions. In environments – such as the ones this work is based on – such conflicts are common, thus, we need a new
approach to reason about uncertainty in the face of conflicting opinions.
The importance of the D2D problem is well understood in the military; D2D is recognized as one of the top seven
challenges to be addressed by the Department of Defense (DoD) Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)∗. As an entity of
the DoD, the research division of the United States Army – i.e., US Army Research Laboratory (ARL) – has invested a lot
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of time and effort in realizing this challenge. ARL provides assistance in conducting basic and applied research in D2D
through a number of collaborative efforts and International Technology Alliance (ITA)† is one such transatlantic effort.
The ITA program is a research program to address issues related to mobile ad-hoc networks for military coalitions. The
research is aimed at fundamental advances in information and network sciences that will enhance decision making for
coalition operations.
Rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we set out the preliminaries for our work. It discusses a formal
model for knowledge representation and highlights the need for reasoning based on uncertainty. It also provides clues to
mechanisms that can assist in performing effective reasoning in uncertain environments. Section 3 introduces a scenario
which highlights the need to have a mechanism to make use of opinions belonging to multiple parties in order to make
informed decisions in the face of lack of trust. In Section 4 we introduce the syntax and semantics of our formalism to
represent uncertainty in knowledge and in Section 5 we show how that formalism can be used to perform trust revisions.
We evaluate our approach in Section 6 and conclude the document in Section 7 with a discussion of related work.
2. BACKGROUND
In order to intelligently reason in uncertain domains – such as the ones discussed in Section 1 – we need a language
to capture the domain effectively and efficiently. In this work, we shall use Description Logics (DLs) for this purpose.
Providing a full overview of DLs is out-of-the scope of this paper. However, we refer the reader to Baader et al.2 for an
overview of DLs.
2.1 DL-based Knowledge Representation
Even for the smallest propositionally closed DL, ALC (which only provides class constructors ¬C,C uD,C unionsqD, ∃R.C
and ∀R.C), the complexity of logical entailment is EXPTIME – a class of decision problems that can be solved by a
deterministic Turing machine. Recently, Calvanese et al.3 proposed DL-Lite, which can express most features in UML
class diagrams with a low reasoning overhead (with data complexity AC0). It is for this reason that we base our model
on DL-Litecore (referred to here as DL-Lite, although there are extensions4), and hence provide a brief formalisation to
ground the subsequent presentation of our model.
A DL-Lite knowledge baseK = (T ,A) consists of a TBox T and an ABoxA. Axioms of the following forms compose
K:
1. class inclusion axioms: B v C ∈ T where B is a basic class B := A | ∃R | ∃R− and C is a general class
C := B | ¬B | C1 uC2 (where A denotes an named class, R denotes a named property, and R− is the inverse of R)
E.g., a car subsumes a vehicle (i.e., Car v Vehicle)
2. individual axioms: B(a), R(a,b) ∈ A where a and b are named individuals. E.g., a jeep is a type of a vehicle –
i.e., Vehicle(Jeep) – and jeep can travel is rough terrain – i.e., canTravel(Jeep , RoughTerrain).
Description Logics have a well-defined model-theoretic semantics, which are provided in terms of interpretations. An
interpretation I is a pair (∆I , ·I), where ∆I is a non-empty set of objects and ·I is an interpretation function, which maps
each class C to a subset CI ⊆ ∆I and each property R to a subset RI ⊆ ∆I × ∆I . Using a trivial normalisation, it is
possible to convert class inclusion axioms of the form B1 v C1 u C2 into a set of simpler class inclusions of the form
B1 v Bi or B1 v ¬Bj , where B1, Bi, and Bj are basic concepts.3 For instance, during normalisation, B1 v B2 u ¬B3
is replaced with B1 v B2 and B1 v ¬B3.
Though the statements in knowledge bases created base on the above formalism is supposed to contain facts, it is in-fact
important to note that those statements may be probabilistic in nature. For example, “detection of a moving vehicle” is
in fact can only be stated with a 90% accuracy. Thus, we need a mechanisms to reason about such uncertain statements.
Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence (DST) provides an explicit framework to reason about such knowledge bases and in
the next section we briefly discuss its variations.
†https://www.usukita.org/
2.2 Subjective Opinions
Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) offers means to characterise an agent’s view of the state of world by assigning basic
probability masses to subsets of truth assignments of propositions in the logic. Jøsang5 proposed Subjective Logic (SL),
which can be considered as an interpretation and extension of DST with logical operators ( e.g., conjunction, deduction,
abduction and so on). Jøsang5 coined the term subjective opinions to refer to uncertain statements. In SL, all the operators
are grounded on probability theory – as oppose to DST – thus, allowing one to consider the mathematical properties of the
fusion easily. In this work, we take Jøsang’s view of DST to represent and reason about uncertain statements.
A binomial opinion about a proposition x is represented by a triple wx = (bx, dx, ux) which is derived from the
basic probability masses assigned to subsets of truth assignments of the language. In the opinion wx, bx, also denoted
by b(wx), is the belief about x — the summation of the probability masses that entail x; dx, also denoted by d(wx), is
the disbelief about x — the summation of the probability masses that entail ¬x; and ux, also denoted by u(wx), is the
uncertainty about x — the summation of the probability masses that neither entail x nor entail ¬x. The constraints over the
probability mass assignment function require that bx+ dx+ux = 1 and bx, dx, ux ∈ [0, 1]. When a more concise notation
is necessary, we use (bx, dx) instead of (bx, dx, ux), since ux = 1− bx − dx. The negation over an opinion wx is defined
as ¬(bx, dx, ux) = (dx, bx, ux) = (b¬x, d¬x, u¬x).
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DEFINITION 1. Let w1 = (b1, d1, u1) and w2 = (b2, d2, u2) be two opinions about the same proposition. We call w1 a
specialisation of w2 (w1  w2) iff b2 ≤ b1 and d2 ≤ d1 (implies u1 ≤ u2). Similarly, we call w1 a generalisation of w2
(w2  w1) iff b1 ≤ b2 and d1 ≤ d2 (implies u2 ≤ u1).
An agent i’s opinion about a proposition x is denoted by wix = (bix, dix, uix). This opinion wix may not be directly used
by another agent j. Agent j could have a view of the reliability or competence of i with respect to x. Shafer1 proposed a
discounting operator ⊗ to normalise the belief and disbelief in wjx based on the degree of trust j has of i with respect to
x:tji . The discounted opinion, wjx, is computed as (bix × t
j
i , d
i
x × t
j
i ). The trustworthiness of information sources can be
modelled using Beta probability density functions.6 A Beta distribution has two parameters (r + 1, s+ 1), where r is the
amount of positive evidence and s is the amount of negative evidence for the trustworthiness agent i agent has for agent j.
The degree of trust tij is then computed as the expectation value of the Beta distribution: tij = (r + 1)/(r + s+ 2).
In the next section, we introduce a coalition-based scenario in which opinions generated from multiple heterogeneous
information sources are used to make informed decisions about critical situations by revising the trust associated with the
information.
3. MOTIVATIONAL SCENARIO
A coalition operating in a mountainous area has planned for a high-value-target (HVT) extraction. The coalition consists of
trusted partners P1, P2 and the local partners Ploc. P1 is executing the HVT extraction and the command and control (C2)
receives information from a local informant – i.e., Pi – about suspicious activity on a road leading to the location where
HVT resides. However, sensor resources belonging to P1 deployed in the area have not picked-up any recent activity.
An observation post owned by Ploc in the north region also reports vehicle movement along the road; the observation is
obtained by interpreting the evidences gathered by using long-range observation devices. However, the trustC2 has on local
informants/militia are very limited due to their past experiences. Meanwhile, the trusted coalition partner P2 is executing a
reconnaissance operation over the same area using a sensing resource S owned by P1. P2, too, observes some activity on
the road based on the aerial images of S. Note that P2 has a good trust value on Pi on events such as reconnaissance,thus,
P2 can vouch for Pi in this context. C2 now 1) increases its trust on the local informants and revises the trust assessments
it has on similar tasks with the local informants 2) start making plans for the eventualities associated with the current task.
In Table 1, we provide a snapshot of the information sources C2 has access to with respect to their trustworthiness.
Assume that Pi reports the observation of the vehicular movement along the road with an opinion of (0.9, 0, 0.1). C2
interprets this opinion based on the trust assessment it has on Pi given in Table 1. Thus, the discounted opinion of the local
informant is (0.412, 0, 0.588) which has a higher uncertainty as oppose to the original report. However, P2 has a better
trust value on Pi in such scenarios; assume that P2’s trust in Pi is 95%. Thus, it can be shown that P2’s opinion of what Pi
reported as (0.855, 0, 0.145). Since C2 trust P2 better, it can be shown that C2 indeed can interpret the opinion expressed
by Pi as (0.838, 0, 0.162) in this context, which has a greater confidence level than the original discount based on C2’s
own experience about Pi
Figure 1. Scenario: high value target extraction
Table 1. Information sources and their trustworthiness
Source Definition Evidence Degree of Trust
Pi Informant (10, 12) 0.458
Ploc Coalition’s Local partner (10, 3) 0.786
S1...3 Acoustic array of P1 (1000, 0) 0.999
P2 Coalition partner of P1 (50, 0) 0.981
An important property to note in the above scenario is the fact that how C2 can revise its trust on local informants when
evidence from trusted partners and resources come to light. This is because, though the prior trust of local informants is
limited to C2’s past experience, with the added information from trusted partners, the less trustworthy source can indeed
increases its trust, at least in some contexts. Such properties can also be used to create trust matrices for future collabora-
tions. Having provided an overview of DLs, DST, and subjective opinions, in the nest section we provide a formalisation
of subjective DLs so that uncertain statements could be captured and reasoned in DL efficiently.
4. SDL-Lite
We propose Subjective DL-Lite (or SDL-Lite for short), which extends DL-Litecore with subjective opinion assertions of
the form B:w, where w is an opinion and B is an ABox axiom (i.e., assertion). Each ABox axiom is associated with one
opinion. ABox axioms have the form B(a) or R(a,b), where B is basic class, R is a property, and a and b are individuals.
4.1 SDL-Lite Semantics
In common with DL-Lite ontologies, the semantics of an ontology in SDL-Lite is defined in terms of subjective interpreta-
tions. Let W be the set of all possible subjective binary opinions. A subjective interpretation is a pair I = (∆I , ·I) where
the domain ∆I is a non-empty set of objects and ·I is a subjective interpretation function, which maps:
Syntax Semantics
> >I(o) = (1, 0, 0)
⊥ ⊥I(o) = (0, 1, 0)
∃R b((∃R)I(o1)) ≥ max ∪
∀o2
{b(RI(o1, o2))} and
d((∃R)I(o1)) ≤ min ∪
∀o2
{d(RI(o1, o2))}
¬B (¬B)I(o) = ¬BI(o)
R− (R−)I(o2, o1) = R
I(o1, o2)
B1 v B2 ∀o ∈ ∆
I
, b(BI1 (o)) ≤ b(B
I
2 (o)) and
d(BI2 (o)) ≤ d(B
I
1 (o))
B1 v ¬B2 ∀o ∈ ∆
I
, b(BI1 (o)) ≤ d(B
I
2 (o)) and
b(BI2 (o)) ≤ d(B
I
1 (o))
B(a):w b(w) ≤ b(BI(aI)) and d(w) ≤ d(BI(aI))
R(a,b):w b(w) ≤ b(RI(aI ,bI)) and d(w) ≤ d(RI(aI ,bI))
Table 2. Semantics of Subjective DL-Lite
• an individual a to an element of aI ∈ ∆I ,
• a named class A to a function AI : ∆I →W ,
• a named property R to a function RI : ∆I ×∆I →W .
To provide a semantics for SDL-Lite, we extend interpretations of DL-Lite class and property descriptions, and of
axioms under unique name assumption. The semantics are presented in Table 2. The semantics of ∃R is derived from
the rule R(aI ,bI) → ∃R(aI), ∀bI ∈ ∆I . This rule constrains the minimum belief and the maximum disbelief that
∃R(aI) can have. For any individuals a and b, the belief in a having a property R (i.e., ∃R(a)), is not less than belief in
a having the property R with b (i.e., R(a,b)), and disbelief in ∃R(a) is not more than disbelief in R(a,b). An ontology
provides us with domain constraints in the form of TBox axioms. For instance, the axiom B1 v B2 means that every
instance of class B1 is also an instance of class B2. This trivially implies ¬B2 v ¬B1, i.e., an individual that is not an
instance of B2 cannot be an instance of B1. Therefore, given an individual a, the axiom B1 v B2 implies that our belief
in B2(a) cannot be less than our belief in B1(a) and our disbelief in B2(a) cannot be more than our disbelief in B1(a).
That is, b(BI1 (aI)) ≤ b(BI2 (aI)) and d(BI2 (aI)) ≤ d(BI1 (aI)) must hold. Similar constraints also exist in Table 2 for
B1 v ¬B2.
DEFINITION 2. An SDL-Lite knowledge base K = (T ,A) is consistent if and only if it has a model. A model of K is an
interpretation of K that satisfies the constraints in Table 2.
If K is consistent, it can have many models, but one of them is the most general model with respect to the partial
ordering on opinions by Definition 1. Providing a detailed description on how to detect consistency, and how to compute
the most general model of a consistent SDL-Lite knowledge base is out-of-the-scope of this paper; we refer the reader
to Murat et al.7 for the details. In the rest of the paper, we assume that the opinion about a specific ABox assertions is
provided by a single source. When there is more than one source for an assertion, only one of them is chosen (e.g. based
on their trustworthiness). This will be relaxed in future. Having described SDL-Lite we now examine a novel application
of the system, describing how evidence from multiple sources can be reasoned about based on the trust placed in these
sources.
5. TRUST-BASED EVIDENCE ANALYSIS
Here we get to the crux of the problem being addressed in this paper: how can we draw reliable conclusions regarding the
state of the world, given evidence acquired from disparate sources (agents), about whom we have variable trust? We refer to
this process as trust-based evidence analysis. Our aim is not to offer a new mechanism for assessing the trustworthiness of
information sources; in fact, we exploit a widely-studied model6 for this purpose based on Beta distributions as described
in Section 2.2. The novelty of this work lies in the use of such models to guide evidence analysis.
5.1 Handling Inconsistencies
SDL-Lite presented in the previous section provides a tractable means to capture and interpret evidence acquired from
other agents. The fact that we have evidence from multiple agents, however, means that there are likely to be inconsisten-
cies in the evidence received. Thus, given evidence (i.e., opinions) from various sources, our knowledge-base may not be
consistent. This is despite the use of discounting through DST. Discounting provides us with a “best-guess” of the relia-
bility of agents based on an aggregation of our prior experiences with, and other knowledge of them as evidence sources.
As with any computational model of trust, the trust assessments that drive discounting are vulnerable to: lack of evidence
about other agents and the effects of whitewashing;8 a conflation of the probability of malicious behaviour and lack compe-
tence/expertise in the evidence-provider; strategic liars; and collusion among evidence-providers. In our running example,
for instance, local police and civilian sources have relatively low trustworthiness, not because of any perceived malicious
intent but due to a belief that they lack experience in providing precise information. With more evidence, trustworthiness
of information sources may be modelled more accurately, but our challenge is to support the analysis of evidence given the
status quo.
To illustrate this challenge, consider our example scenario in which Pi reports of a vehicular movement along the road.
Based on the trustworthiness values given in Table 1, C2’s discounted opinion of Pi’s observation is (0.412, 0, 0.588).
However, the discounted opinion C2 obtained from observations of P1’s acoustic array (i.e., S1...3) is (0.099, 0.799, 0.102).
This clearly represents a conflict since 0.412 + 0.799 > 1 and would result in an inconsistent knowledge-base. Let w1 =
(0.412, 0, 0.588) and w2 = (0.099, 0.799, 0.102). The conflicting portions of w1 and w2 are c12 = 0.412 and c21 = 0.799.
Let us refer to the trustworthiness of the sources of w1 and w2 as t1 and t2 respectively. In our example, from Table 1,
t1 = 0.458 and t2 = 0.999. In order for us to transform our inconsistent knowledge-base into a consistent knowledge-base,
from which we can draw valid conclusions given our semantics, we need to determine additional discounting factors x1
and x2 for opinions w1 and w2 such that 0 ≤ c12.x1 + c21.x2 ≤ 1.
In this paper, we specify this problem as that of finding additional discounting factors for the belief-mass distributions
of pieces of evidence to make our knowledge-base consistent. In general, our conflict resolution problem is a tuple 〈C,X〉
where C is the set of conflicting portions that appear in the extended knowledge base, and X is a set of additional discount-
ing factors corresponding to C. We require that, in 〈C,X〉, ∀cij ∈ C, ∃cji ∈ C and ∃xi, xj ∈ X . Then, a solution to this
problem is an assignment of values to each xi ∈ X such that
∀cij , cji ∈ C, ∀xi, xj ∈ X 0 ≤ cij .xi + cji.xj ≤ 1
There are many heuristic approaches to solving this problem, among them being to consider only consistent knowledge
to draw conclusions from the evidence received; i.e. ∀xi ∈ X , xi = 0. This, however, could lead to a significant loss
of evidence. Here, we explore a nuber of increasingly refined approaches that guarantee the generation of a consisitent
knowledge-base: trust-based deleting, trust-based discounting and evidence-based discounting.
5.2 Trust-based deleting
If two opinions w1 and w2 are in conflict, the opinion from the less trustworthy source is deleted, and if both sources are
equally trustworthy both opinions are deleted. Thus, if the trust we have in the source of opinion w1 is greater than that of
the source of w2 (t1 > t2) then x2 = 0 and x1 = 1, and in the event that t1 = t2 we assign x1 = x2 = 0.
5.3 Trust-based discounting
If two opinions w1 and w2 are in conflict, they are discounted in proportion to the trustworthiness of their sources. That is,
the additional discounting factor for w1 and w2 is computed using t1/(c12t1 + c21t2) and t2/(c12t1 + c21t2), respectively,
where t1 and t2 are the trustworthiness of the sources of the opinions. In our example, an additional discount factor for
Pi’s opinion is 0.386 and that of S1...3 is 0.842, since the trustworthiness of Pi and S1...3 are 0.458 and 0.999, respectively.
Therefore, to resolve the conflict, the original opinion of Pi is discounted by 0.458 × 0.386 = 0.177 and that of S1...3 is
discounted by 0.999× 0.842 = 0.841. However, this approach neglects the amount of evidence used to calculate trust in
sources.
5.4 Evidence-based discounting
Within the evidence analysis domain, the information that we have to work with relates to past experiences with a specific
agent (i.e., information source) %k where information received has proven reliable or unreliable according to some criteria
(as would be captured in any trust assessment model). In other words, the amount of positive evidence we have for
agent %k, namely rk, and the amount of negative evidence for that agent, namely sk. From this evidence, we calculate
trustworthiness of %k, denoted as tk described in Section 2.2. When we receive opinion wki from %k, we discount it by tk
and add the resulting opinion wi to our knowledge base. However, as explained before, additional discounting by factor xi
is required when wi is in conflict with another opinion in the knowledge base. Discounting wi by xi implies discounting
the original opinion wki by tk.xi. This corresponds to revising the trustworthiness of wki as tk.xi by speculating about
the trustworthiness of %k regarding this single opinion. That is, even though the trustworthiness of %k is tk based on the
existing evidence (rk, sk), it becomes tk.xi for this specific opinion wki ; so, tkxi effectively becomes the trust in wki . Here,
we create a metric to measure how much we speculate about the trustworthiness of %k regarding wki .
First, to decrease trust from tk to tk.xi, we need additional negative evidence, which is called speculative evidence
and denoted as ρi. Our intuition is that it is less likely for a trustworthy agent to present additional negative speculative
evidence than it is for an untrustworthy agent, and thus the receipt of such evidence should be tempered by (t¯k)κ. Here,
t¯k represents the distrust we have in agent %k; i.e. the likelihood that we will receive additional negative evidence given
our experiences with the source. The calibration constant κ ≥ 0 enables us to vary the influence that prior experience has
on our prediction that an individual will present negative evidence in the future. If κ = 0, for example, we assume that all
sources are equally likely to provide negative evidence. Now, using the Beta distribution formula for trust, we obtain:
tk.xi =
rk + 1
rk + sk + 2
· xi =
rk + 1
sk + rk + 2 + ρi.(t¯k)κ
=
rk + 1
sk + rk + 2 + ρi.(
sk+1
rk+sk+2
)κ
Rearranging this for ρi yields:
ρi =
νi(1− xi)
xi
where νi =
(rk + sk + 2)
κ+1
(sk + 1)κ
(1)
Given two conflicting subjective opinions wi and wj , there can be different additional discounting factors that can be
used to resolve the conflict. Let us assume that xi and xj are additional discounting factors used to resolve the conflict.
The cost of this resolution in terms of the total amount of speculative evidence can be computed as
νi(1 − xi)
xi
+
νj(1 − xj)
xj
where νi and νj are constants that are calculated as described in Equation 1. When we have multiple conflicts, they may
interact in such a way that resolving one may also affect the resolution of another. The overall amount of speculative
evidence necessary to resolve all of these relevant conflicts can easily be formulated as a function of additional discount
factors. Once, we have this function, we can find the discounting factors to have a solution with the minimum total
speculative evidence.
Assume we have a set of conflicting opinions {〈wi, wj〉, . . . , 〈wm, wn〉} and, derived from trust evidence about agents,
coefficients {νi, νj , . . . , νm, νn}. To determine the optimum discounting factors {xi, xj , . . . , xm, xn} for these opinions,
we construct the following optimisation problem with a multivariate non-linear objective function and linear constraints.
argmin
−→x
f(−→x ) where
f(〈xi, xj , . . . , xm, xn〉) =
νi(1 − xi)
xi
+
νj(1 − xj)
xj
+ . . .
νm(1− xm)
xm
+
νn(1 − xn)
xn
such that 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, 0 ≤ xj ≤ 1, . . .
and 0 ≤ cijxi + cjixj ≤ 1, . . . (2)
Existing constrained non-linear programming methods can be used to solve this problem in order to estimate the best
discounting factors. There are various techniques that may be used including Interior-Point and Active-Set algorithms. In
this work, we use Interior-Point approximation. Details of these methods are out of the scope of this paper and can be
found elsewhere.9
In this section we have formalised the problem of computing additional discounting factors for opinions received about
the world from other agent so that we may formulate a consistent SDL-Lite knowledge-base from which we can draw
reliable conclusions. We have presented a number of approaches to the resolutions of inconsistencies between opinions
including an optimisation-based approach, evidence-based discounting. Next, we evaluate these approaches with respect
to their robustness in the face of liars.
6. EVALUATION
We have evaluated our approach through a set of simulations. In each simulation, we define the domain by randomly gen-
erating an SDL-Lite TBox that contains 100 concepts and roles, as well as axioms over those, e.g., B1 v B2 and B2 v ¬∃R3.
For each role or concept, there is one information source that provides opinions about its instances, e.g., B1(a):(0.8, 0, 0.2)
and R3(a, b):(0.5, 0.1, 0.4). There are 10 information sources in total, each is an expert on 10 concepts and roles, and provides
its opinions about those.
In our simulations, we assume there is one information consumer that uses the information from sources to make
decisions. Each simulation is composed of 10 iterations. At each iteration t, the consumer needs to gather information
about an individual a. We generate ground truth about a, which is composed of one assertion about a for each concept
and role with an associated opinion. Each information source knows the ground truth only about the concepts and roles of
their expertise. However, they may not provide the ground truth to the consumer when it is requested. Behaviours of the
information sources are determined by their behavioural type, which are summarised as follows.
• Honest: Most of the time, this type of sources provide the ground truth about the assertion of their expertise with
small Gaussian noise N(0, 0.01). With probability Pb, honest sources behave like malicious ones and provide bogus
information.
• Malicious: This type of sources aim at misleading the information consumer by providing bogus opinions. More
specifically, given (b, d, ) is the ground truth about an assertion, a malicious source provides the opinion (abs(1), 0.9+
2, ) if b ≈ d; otherwise it provides the opinion (d+ 1, b+ 2, ), where 1, 2 ∈ [−0.05, 0.05]. There are two types
of malicious sources, which are defined as follows:
i. Simple liars: they always provide bogus opinions.
ii. Strategic liars: they behave like honest sources to build trust and then provides bogus information exploiting
the built trust. After providing misleading information to the consumer, they change their identity to avoid
negative evidence against them.
After collecting opinions about different assertions from information sources, the information consumer uses its trust in
these sources to discount these opinions and uses the proposed reasoning mechanisms for SDL-Lite to compute interpre-
tations. Ideally, these interpretations should be close to the ground truth if all sources are accurate and their trustworthiness
is modelled correctly. If there are some malicious sources, there may be conflicts in the collected information. In the case
of conflicts, the consumer resolve the conflicts using Naive Deleting (NDL), Trust-based Deleting (TDL), Trust-based Dis-
counting (TDC), or Evidence-based Discounting (EDC) with κ = 1. In NDL, all conflicting opinions are deleted from the
knowledge base to resolve the conflicts. The consumer computes the interpretations for concept and role assertions related
to a, after resolving the conflicts if any. Then, we measure the performance as the mean absolute error in the computed
interpretations. Let (b, d, u) be the ground truth and (b′, d′, u′) be the computed interpretation for assertion B(a), then the
absolute error in the interpretation is computed as errB(a) = abs(δb) + abs(δd), where δb = b′ − b and δd = d′ − d. For
instance, if the ground truth about B(a) is (0.9, 0.05, 0.05), but the computed interpretation is (0.05, 0.9, 0.05), then the error
would be 1.7.
At the end of each iteration, the consumer learns the ground truth and updates the trustworthiness of the information
sources with new evidence (rt, st) computed as in Equation 3, which is based on the intuition that the information is still
useful if it has a small amount of noise or is slightly discounted.
(rt, st) =


(0, 1), if δb > 0.1 or δd > 0.1
(1, 0), if −0.1 ≤ δb ≤ 0.01 and −0.1 ≤ δd ≤ 0.01
(0, 0), otherwise.
(3)
Each of our simulations are repeated 10 times and our results are significant based on t-test with a confidence interval of
0.95.
Without any evidence, the trustworthiness of sources is computed as 0.5. Thus, there are is no conflict in the beginning
of our simulations. If all sources have deterministic behaviours, i.e., malicious sources are simple liars and Pb = 0, then
trustworthiness of sources are easily modelled over time and the opinions from liars are significantly discounted. In such
settings, conflicts are totally avoided and information consumers using either of the four proposed methods have the same
level of success. Figure 2 shows an example of this setting where honest sources always provides the truth (Pb = 0) and
malicious sources are simple liars. Here, the ratio of liars (Rliar) is 0.5, i.e., half of the sources are malicious.
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Figure 2. Simple liars (Rliar = 0.5 and Pb = 0)
When honest sources provide bogus information occasionally, the conflicts may arise in the knowledge base of the
consumer, because the information from these sources are not significantly discounted. Figure 3 shows our results for
Rliar = 0.5 and Pb = 0.1, where all malicious sources are simple liars. In this setting, NDL leads to significant errors in
the computed interpretations. While TDL does much better than NDL, it is outperformed by discounting based approaches
TDC and EDC. Both of these approaches have similarly good performance though TDC does slightly better.
Simple liars may not be enough to model malicious sources in real life. That is why we change the type of malicious
sources to strategic liars and repeat our simulations. Figure 4 shows our results for Rliar = 0.5 and Pb = 0.1. In this
settings, trust evaluations become misleading, since strategic liars build trust, make their impact and then change their
identity to avoid any negative evidence. As a result, as shown in the figure, TDC fails significantly more than EDC after a
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Figure 3. Simple liars (Rliar = 0.5 and Pb = 0.1)
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Figure 4. Strategic liars (Rliar = 0.5 and Pb = 0.1)
few iterations. We repeat the simulations with strategic liars for different Rliar values; our results are shown in Figure 5.
Our results indicate that evidence-based discounting is much more robust in the presence of realistic malicious behaviour
than trust-based discounting or deletion.
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Figure 5. Strategic liars with varying Rliar (Pb = 0.1)
7. DISCUSSION
DL-Lite is a tractable subset of DLs with a large number of application areas.10 Its scalability makes it very useful espe-
cially for the settings where large amount of data should be queried. However, in a network of heterogeneous sources, any
information provided by the sources could be uncertain, incomplete, and even conflicting. DL-Lite cannot accommodate
such information. Pan et al.11 proposed a framework of tractable query answering algorithms for a family of fuzzy query
languages over large fuzzy DL-Lite12 ontologies. On the other hand, DST and its extensions such as Subjective Logic
explicitly takes into account uncertainty and belief ownership.5
Gobeck and Halaschek13 present a belief revision algorithm for OWL-DL, which is based on trust degrees to remove
conflicting statements from a knowledge base. However, as the authors point out, the proposed algorithm is not guaranteed
to be optimal. In our work, we embed statement retraction implicitly into the opinion revision procedure with a global
optimal criteria which is grounded on a Beta distribution formalisation of trust.
Fact-finding algorithms aim to identify the truth given conflicting claims. Pasternack and Roth14 propose to translate
these claims to a linear program, which is solved to obtain belief scores over claims. For example, with TruthFinder,15
the belief scores obtained can be interpreted as the result of simultaneously minimising the frustration coming from the
sources against the claims. These approaches do not consider semantics while reasoning about belief and trustworthiness
as we do here.
There are several models for computing trust and reputation in multiagent systems. In these models, direct evidence
is combined with indirect evidence to model trust in agents. Direct evidence is based on personal observations, while
indirect evidence is received from other agents that serve as information sources. Jøsang and Ismail proposed the beta
reputation system (BRS).6 It estimates the likelihood of proposition “Agent i is trustworthy” – i.e., trustworthiness of the
agent i – using beta probability density functions. For this purpose, aggregation of direct evidence and indirect evidence
(i.e., ratings) from information sources are used as the parameters of beta distributions. Evidence shared by sources are
equivalent to binary opinions in Subjective Logic.5 Whitby et al. extended BRS to handle misleading opinions from
malicious sources using a majority-based algorithm.16 Teacy et al. proposed TRAVOS,17 which is similar to BRS, but it
uses personal observations about information sources to estimate their trustworthiness as we do in this paper.
In this paper, we describe conflicts between binomial opinions and propose an approach to resolve conflicts before
performing fusion. Conflicts in knowledge lead to inconsistencies that hamper the reasoning over the knowledge. There-
fore, before using such knowledge bases, their conflicts should be resolved. Gobeck and Halaschek13 present a belief
revision algorithm for ontologies, which is based on trust degrees of information sources to remove conflicting statements
from a knowledge base. However, as the authors point out, the proposed algorithm is not guaranteed to be optimal. Dong
et al.18 propose to resolve conflicts in information from multiple sources by a voting mechanism. Double counting in
votes is avoided by considering the information dependencies among sources. The dependences are derived from Bayesian
analysis.
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